From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, devel@edk2.groups.io,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 08:37:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b2bcb506-d0a6-eae7-e051-ec180b48d4dc@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e4915240-a3d5-a2a1-2f3b-61c4ffc0188e@redhat.com>
Hi Laszlo,
On 6/7/21 6:54 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> Hi Brijesh,
>
> On 05/27/21 01:11, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> BZ: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C107d760e06824b1b6d6d08d929aaffd3%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637586636747299845%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=KQ42j9fOtsJfCh2iziap1v%2BBqC%2FHfR%2BR9ZbO3JHAJaM%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> The GHCB Version 2 introduces advertisement of features that are supported
>> by the hypervisor. The features value is saved in the SevEs workarea. Save
>> the value in the PCD for the later use.
>>
>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
>> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
>> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
>> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 1 +
>> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 2 +
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 26 +++++
>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++
>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 1 +
>> 5 files changed, 152 insertions(+)
> (1) Please split this patch: the PlatformPei changes should be in the second patch.
Noted.
>
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
>> index bc1dcac48343..3256ccfe88d8 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
>> @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ [Pcd]
>> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApStackSize
>> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsIsEnabled
>> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevSnpIsEnabled
>> + gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
>>
>> [FixedPcd]
>> gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h
>> index 24507de55c5d..dd1c97d4a9a3 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h
>> @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ typedef struct _SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA {
>> UINT64 RandomData;
>>
>> UINT64 EncryptionMask;
>> +
>> + UINT64 HypervisorFeatures;
>> } SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA;
>>
>> //
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
>> index 67b78fd5fa36..81e40e0889aa 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
>> @@ -43,6 +43,27 @@ AmdSevSnpInitialize (
>> ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
>> }
>>
>> +/**
>> +
>> + Function to set the PcdHypervisorFeatures.
>> +**/
>> +STATIC
>> +VOID
>> +AmdSevHypervisorFeatures (
>> + VOID
>> + )
>> +{
>> + SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *SevEsWorkArea;
>> + RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus;
>> +
>> + SevEsWorkArea = (SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *) FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase);
>> +
>> + PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures, SevEsWorkArea->HypervisorFeatures);
>> + ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
>> +
>> + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "GHCB Hypervisor Features=0x%Lx\n", SevEsWorkArea->HypervisorFeatures));
> (2) Overlong line.
>
> Please avoid basic mistakes like this, even in an RFC series.
I will split it, but all the checkpatch and CI stuff passed on my branch
before the submission.
>
>
>> +}
>> +
>> /**
>>
>> Initialize SEV-ES support if running as an SEV-ES guest.
>> @@ -73,6 +94,11 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
>> PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (PcdSevEsIsEnabled, TRUE);
>> ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
>>
>> + //
>> + // Set the hypervisor features PCD.
>> + //
>> + AmdSevHypervisorFeatures ();
>> +
>> //
>> // Allocate GHCB and per-CPU variable pages.
>> // Since the pages must survive across the UEFI to OS transition
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
>> index 6838cdeec9c3..75e63d2a0561 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm
>> @@ -62,6 +62,16 @@ BITS 32
>> %define GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT 30
>> %define CPUID_INSN_LEN 2
>>
>> +; GHCB SEV Information MSR protocol
>> +%define GHCB_SEV_INFORMATION_REQUEST 2
>> +%define GHCB_SEV_INFORMATION_RESPONSE 1
> (3) These macro names do not match the ones in "MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Fam17Msr.h" (GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO_GET, GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO, respectively).
>
> They don't *have* to match, technically speaking, but one goal of using macros for magic numbers is so we can grep the source for them. The macros just below (for values 128 and 129) do match the header file.
Noted, I will match them.
>
>> +
>> +; GHCB Hypervisor features MSR protocol
>> +%define GHCB_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES_REQUEST 128
>> +%define GHCB_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES_RESPONSE 129
>> +
>> +; GHCB request to terminate protocol values
>> +%define GHCB_GENERAL_TERMINATE_REQUEST 255
> (4) Not only does this macro name not match the one in the header file (which is GHCB_INFO_TERMINATE_REQUEST), even the value is wrong. The header file has
>
> #define GHCB_INFO_TERMINATE_REQUEST 256
>
> and I checked the GHCBv2 spec too; there is no operation defined with opcode 255.
>
Ah good catch. Thanks
>>
>> ; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) features are enabled.
>> ;
>> @@ -86,6 +96,13 @@ CheckSevFeatures:
>> ; will set it to 1.
>> mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_SNP], 0
>>
>> + ; Set the Hypervisor features field in the workarea to zero to communicate
>> + ; to the hypervisor features to the SEC phase. The hypervisor feature is
>> + ; filled during the call to CheckHypervisorFeatures.
>> + mov eax, 0
>> + mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES], eax
>> + mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES + 4], eax
>> +
>> ;
>> ; Set up exception handlers to check for SEV-ES
>> ; Load temporary RAM stack based on PCDs (see SevEsIdtVmmComm for
>> @@ -225,6 +242,106 @@ IsSevEsEnabled:
>> SevEsDisabled:
>> OneTimeCallRet IsSevEsEnabled
>>
>> +; The version 2 of GHCB specification added the support to query the hypervisor features.
>> +; If the GHCB version is >=2 then read the hypervisor features.
>> +;
>> +; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX
>> +;
>> +CheckHypervisorFeatures:
> (5) Arguably this label name should contain "Sev".
Noted.
>
>> + ; Get the SEV Information
>> + ; Setup GHCB MSR
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = SEV information request
>> + ;
>> + mov edx, 0
>> + mov eax, GHCB_SEV_INFORMATION_REQUEST
>> + mov ecx, 0xc0010130
>> + wrmsr
>> +
>> + ;
>> + ; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
>> + ; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
>> + ;
>> +BITS 64
>> + rep vmmcall
>> +BITS 32
>> +
>> + ;
>> + ; SEV Information Response GHCB MSR
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[63:48] = Maximum protocol version
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[47:32] = Minimum protocol version
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = SEV information response
>> + ;
>> + mov ecx, 0xc0010130
>> + rdmsr
>> + and eax, 0xfff
>> + cmp eax, GHCB_SEV_INFORMATION_RESPONSE
>> + jnz TerminateSevGuestLaunch
> (6) Before modifying the ResetVector module like this, please insert a refactoring patch as follows:
>
> - A new SEV-specific assembly include file should be introduced. The majority of the "OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm" file now deals with SEV aspects, but the file-top comment still says "Sets the CR3 register for 64-bit paging". It's high time that we move SEV stuff to a file with a name that references SEV.
>
> - We now have five (5) invocations of the GHCB MSR protocol in this file, and every one of them open-codes the same setup, the same 0xc0010130 MSR constant, the same retval check logic with possible guest termination, the same "rep vmmcall" workaround for the 32-bit limitation of NASM, and so on. this file is now borderline unreadable. At the minimum, please introduce a function-like NASM macro with two arguments (= the request & response opcodes), and extract as much as possible.
>
Okay, I will try moving all the SEV specific stuff outside this file.
>
>> + shr edx, 16
>> + cmp edx, 2
>> + jl CheckHypervisorFeaturesDone
>> +
>> + ; Get the hypervisor features
>> + ; Setup GHCB MSR
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Hypervisor features request
>> + ;
>> + mov edx, 0
>> + mov eax, GHCB_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES_REQUEST
>> + mov ecx, 0xc0010130
>> + wrmsr
>> +
>> + ;
>> + ; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
>> + ; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
>> + ;
>> +BITS 64
>> + rep vmmcall
>> +BITS 32
>> +
>> + ;
>> + ; Hypervisor features reponse
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[63:12] = Features bitmap
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Hypervisor features response
>> + ;
>> + mov ecx, 0xc0010130
>> + rdmsr
>> + mov ebx, eax
>> + and eax, 0xfff
>> + cmp eax, GHCB_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES_RESPONSE
>> + jnz TerminateSevGuestLaunch
>> +
>> + shr ebx, 12
>> + mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES], ebx
>> + mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES + 4], edx
> (7) According to the spec, the FEATURES bitmap is a contiguous bitmap of 52 bits. The way the EDX:EAX qword is shifted right by 12 bits above is incorrect. The EAX half is shifted OK (through EBX), but the EDX half is not shifted down by 12 bits at all, it is simply stored to the most significant dword of the "HypervisorFeatures" field. This basically inserts a 12 bit wide gap in the FEATURES bitmap.
Noted, I will fix it.
>
>> +
>> + jmp CheckHypervisorFeaturesDone
>> +TerminateSevGuestLaunch:
>> + ;
>> + ; Setup GHCB MSR
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[23:16] = 0
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[15:12] = 0
>> + ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Terminate Request
>> + ;
>> + mov edx, 0
>> + mov eax, GHCB_GENERAL_TERMINATE_REQUEST
> (8) The "MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Fam17Msr.h" header file introduces GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB, GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_GENERAL, GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL. Can we use some of those here (with a separate, but matching, NASM macro of course)? See SevEsProtocolFailure() in "OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c".
Sure, while moving SEV bits in a separate file I will try to define a
matching macros for it.
>
>
>> + mov ecx, 0xc0010130
>> + wrmsr
>> +
>> + ;
>> + ; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
>> + ; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
>> + ;
>> +BITS 64
>> + rep vmmcall
>> +BITS 32
>> +
>> +TerminateSevGuestLaunchHlt:
>> + cli
>> + hlt
>> + jmp TerminateSevGuestLaunchHlt
>> +
>> +CheckHypervisorFeaturesDone:
>> + OneTimeCallRet CheckHypervisorFeatures
>> +
>> ;
>> ; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX
>> ;
>> @@ -328,6 +445,11 @@ clearGhcbMemoryLoop:
>> mov dword[ecx * 4 + GHCB_BASE - 4], eax
>> loop clearGhcbMemoryLoop
>>
>> + ;
>> + ; It is SEV-ES guest, query the Hypervisor features
>> + ;
>> + OneTimeCall CheckHypervisorFeatures
>> +
>> SetCr3:
>> ;
>> ; Set CR3 now that the paging structures are available
>> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
>> index 1971557b1c00..5beba3ecb290 100644
>> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
>> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
>> @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
>> %define SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_SNP (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase) + 1)
>> %define SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_RDRAND (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase) + 8)
>> %define SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase) + 16)
>> + %define SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_HYPERVISOR_FEATURES (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase) + 24)
>> %define SEV_ES_VC_TOP_OF_STACK (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase) + FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize))
>> %include "Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm"
>> %include "Ia32/PageTables64.asm"
>>
> (9) And, I'm arriving at the following assertion only now unfortunately, after spending about 4 hours on reviewing this patch, and the history of SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA.
>
> I assert that the "SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA.HypervisorFeatures" field should not exist. The only read site is here, in "OvmfPkg/PlatformPei".
I choose to cache as much as I could during the reset vector time so
that we avoid the need for VmgExit later. But now I understand that you
prefer to query those information when they are needed and not use the
SevEsWorkArea as a cache for other information.
Also, I was trying to avoid the cases where the malicious hypervisor
changing the feature value after the GHCB negotiation is completed.
e.g, during the reset vector they give us one feature value and change
them during SEC or PEI or DXE instances run. They can't break the
security of SNP by doing so, but I thought its good to avoid querying
the features on every phase.
>
> Instead, we should have a new MemEncryptSevLib function that outputs the FEATURES bitmask. It should be similar to MemEncryptSevGetEncryptionMask(), but it should return a RETURN_STATUS, and produce the FEATURES bitmask through an output parameter.
This is one of thing which I noticed last week, we are actually creating
a circular dependency. The MemEncryptSevLib provides the routines which
are used by the VmgExitLib. The MemEncryptSevLib should *not* depend on
the VmgExitLib. If we extend the MemEncryptSevLib to provide a routine
to query the features then we will be required to include the
VmgExitLib. The patch #13 extends the MemEncryptSevLib to provide
functions for the page validation and it requires the VmgExitLib. I am
trying to see what I can do to not create this circular dependency and
still keep code reuse.
Thanks
Brijesh
>
> The SEC instance of the function should return RETURN_UNSUPPORTED.
>
> The PEI instance should use the GHCB MSR protocol, with the help of the AsmCpuId(), AsmWriteMsr64(), AsmReadMsr64() and AsmVmgExit() BaseLib functions.
>
> The DXE instance should read back the PCD.
>
> And so the OvmfPkg/ResetVector hunks should be dropped from this patch.
>
> Thanks,
> Laszlo
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-07 13:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-26 23:10 [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 01/22] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 8:15 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 12:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:07 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-03 13:38 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 02/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:43 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:10 ` [PATCH RFC v3 03/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 14:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 11:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 8:17 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 16:42 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 04/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 11:54 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 13:37 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-08 8:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 21:36 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-09 10:50 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 05/22] OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 12:26 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:48 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 17:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:22 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 15:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 9:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 15:43 ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 18:01 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 06/22] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 07/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 08/22] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 09/22] OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 10/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 11/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 12/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 13/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 14/22] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 15/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 16/22] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 17/22] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 18/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 19/22] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 20/22] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 21/22] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-05-26 23:11 ` [PATCH RFC v3 22/22] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 13:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-08 1:17 ` 回复: " gaoliming
2021-05-27 9:42 ` [edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-02 17:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 9:32 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-04 11:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 13:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-07 12:04 ` Laszlo Ersek
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