From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Dov.Murik1@il.ibm.com,
ashish.kalra@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, tobin@ibm.com,
david.kaplan@amd.com, jon.grimm@amd.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
frankeh@us.ibm.com,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/6] SEV Encrypted Boot for Ovmf
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 09:13:28 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b4997fae-7ebc-3fa1-a6cf-b5209f105bf5@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2f0c10ac-d4b1-0873-0ef2-aeeea9b0d001@arm.com>
On 12/01/20 09:05, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 11/30/20 9:28 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
>> v3:
>>
>> - More grub and boot stripping (I think I got everything out, but
>> there may be something that strayed in the boot panic resolution).
>> - grub.sh tidy up with tabs->spaces.
>> - Move the reset vector GUIDisation patch to the front so it can be
>> applied independently
>> - Update the .dsc and .fdf files for variable policy
>>
>> v2:
>>
>> - Strip more out of AmdSev image (networking, secure boot, smm)
>> - give sev reset block a generic table guid and use it for boot secret
>> area
>> - separate secret patches and make grub script more robust
>> - Add copyrights and fix formatting issues
>>
>> v1:
>>
>> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
>>
>> This patch series is modelled on the structure of the Bhyve patches
>> for Ovmf, since it does somewhat similar things. This patch series
>> creates a separate build for an AmdSev OVMF.fd that does nothing
>> except combine with grub and boot straight through the internal grub
>> to try to mount an encrypted volume.
>>
>
> This all looks reasonable to me, although I defer to Laszlo when it
> comes to assessing the impact on maintainability of other platforms
> under OvmfPkg.
>
> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Thanks for reviewing this! I'll go through v3 later.
And, indeed, it was my request / suggestion (off-list, earlier) that the
feature please be implemented as a separate platform under OvmfPkg. This
new platform has very different goals from the earlier ones; in
particular their attitude about integration with the host side is
entirely different.
>
> Is there any point to keeping the TPM bits in the AmdSev platform?
I wondered that myself, when I was suggesting the removal of multiple
feature flags (such as SMM_REQUIRE, SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, etc). TPM_ENABLE
didn't look immediately wrong or unsupportable in the new platform, so I
didn't suggest removing it.
> Or
> are these completely orthogonal? If there is no meaningful way [yet] to
> plumb these together, it might be better to just rip that out entirely
> so people don't make assumptions.
It's certainly good to trim this platform to the bare minimum, I'm just
generally unsure about TPM (swtpm / vTPM) use cases with OVMF (I never
use that feature, personally). I wouldn't want to regress an otherwise
valid use case.
Thanks
Laszlo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-01 8:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-30 20:28 [PATCH v3 0/6] SEV Encrypted Boot for Ovmf James Bottomley
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: convert SEV-ES Reset Block structure to be GUIDed James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:10 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: add Grub Firmware Volume Package James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:39 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] OvmfPkg: create a SEV secret area in the AmdSev memfd James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:42 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: assign and protect the Sev Secret area James Bottomley
2020-12-01 7:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-12-01 18:36 ` [edk2-devel] " James Bottomley
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:46 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-09 12:02 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-09 15:46 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-09 15:54 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-09 16:33 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-09 16:38 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-09 16:51 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-09 17:04 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-10 9:12 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-10 9:27 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-01 8:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] SEV Encrypted Boot for Ovmf Ard Biesheuvel
2020-12-01 8:13 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2020-12-01 15:26 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-01 8:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-03 12:26 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-03 14:27 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-04 0:46 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-04 1:05 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-04 1:55 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-04 2:01 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-14 19:57 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-21 15:00 ` Laszlo Ersek
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