From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>, devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 01/19] OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 16:42:18 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b5ab127e-28b5-a378-2f5c-c5ce355046c0@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <778bc927-94b0-56cb-708b-612d2498dc4b@redhat.com>
On 4/13/21 4:49 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> On 04/12/21 16:52, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> Hi James and Laszlo,
>>
>> I was planning to work to add the support to reserve the Secrets and
>> CPUID page in E820 map and then create the EFI configuration table entry
>> for it so that guest OS can reach to it. We have two packages
>> "SecretDxe" and "SecretPei" in OvmfPkg/AmdSev. Any issues if I use them
>> in the OvmfPkg.dsc ? Here is what I was thinking:
>>
>> 1) Rename the PcdSevLaunchSecretBase -> PcdSevSecretsBase
>>
>> 2) When SNP is enabled then VMM use this page as secrets page for the SNP
>>
>> 3) When SEV or SEV-ES is enabled then VMM uses this page as a launch
>> secret page
>>
>> This will allow me to drop PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase. This will not just
>> save 4-bytes but also minimize the code duplication.
> I'm pretty unhappy about needing a separate page for each such purpose.
> We're wasting room in MEMFD. The GUIDed structs that we expose to QEMU
> seem to be flexible enough to describe non-page-aligned addresses,
> right? Can we pack larger amounts of cruft into MEMFD pages?
>
> I'm not looking forward to the day when we run out of slack in MEMFD and
> we get to shift PEIFV / DXEFV. (Every time we need to increase the DXEFV
> size, the same risk exists -- which is why I've been thinking for a
> while now that OVMF includes too many features already.) This can
> introduce obscure changes to the UEFI memory map, which has caused
> compat problems in the past, for example with the "crash" utility.
What's your take to move all SEV-specific reserved pages at the end of
PcdOvmfDecompressionScratchEnd ? I have not tried yet, but I can give
try to make sure the ES works after such moves.
What is a general rule of thump to what goes in MEMFD ? Is this all the
data pages accessed during the SEC phase ? If so, then we probably can't
do everything after the PcdOvmfDecompressionScratchEnd. The only thing
which we can quickly move out is a secret page.
> The feature creep in OVMF has gone off the rails in the last few years,
> really. (Not that I'm not guilty myself.)
>
> Thanks,
> Laszlo
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-19 21:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-24 15:31 [RFC PATCH 00/19] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support brijesh.singh
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-06 8:11 ` Min Xu
2021-04-06 12:16 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 0:21 ` Min Xu
2021-04-07 0:44 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-07 15:02 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 15:12 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-08 6:24 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-04-08 13:31 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-04-09 12:29 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 13:32 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 13:44 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-09 14:11 ` separate OVMF binary for TDX? [was: OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest] Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-12 8:35 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-04-12 11:54 ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-12 14:33 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-14 23:34 ` erdemaktas
2021-04-15 7:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 19:42 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-04-21 0:38 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-21 10:44 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-21 17:07 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-04-22 14:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 13:22 ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] OvmfPkg: Reserve the Secrets and Cpuid page for the SEV-SNP guest Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-07 13:24 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08 0:45 ` Min Xu
2021-04-07 0:31 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-12 14:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 9:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-13 11:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 13:13 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-19 21:42 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-04-20 8:14 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 02/19] OvmfPkg: validate the data pages used in the SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:31 ` [RFC PATCH 03/19] MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 04/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 05/19] MdePkg: Define the GHCB GPA structure Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 06/19] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 07/19] OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 08/19] OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 09/19] MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support Brijesh Singh
2021-03-25 2:49 ` 回复: [edk2-devel] " gaoliming
2021-03-25 10:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-26 20:02 ` Andrew Fish
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 10/19] OvmfPkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 11/19] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 12/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-04-01 6:37 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-04-01 13:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 13/19] OvmfPkg/SecMain: Validate the data/code pages used for the PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 14/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate RAM in " Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 15/19] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 16/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-01 6:43 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 17/19] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 18/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Validate the memory during set or clear enc attribute Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 19/19] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Skip page state change for non RAM region Brijesh Singh
2021-03-24 19:14 ` [edk2-devel] [RFC PATCH 00/19] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08 9:58 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-08 11:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-09 12:24 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-09 22:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-12 16:23 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-12 20:14 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-13 13:00 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-14 11:18 ` Brijesh Singh
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