From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
"Jian J Wang" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
edk2-devel-groups-io <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
"Bret Barkelew" <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com>,
"qemu devel list" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
"Erik Bjorge" <erik.c.bjorge@intel.com>,
"Sean Brogan" <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: privileged entropy sources in QEMU/KVM guests
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 14:33:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <beea35c7-9608-fc2c-846a-8787c07c9c67@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19fc6a42-e773-f8b8-db4a-c8ed853da30c@redhat.com>
On 11/07/19 13:50, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 07/11/19 12:55, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
>>> Yes, I would make SMM use a cryptographic pseudo-random number generator
>>> and seed it from virtio-rng from DXE, way before the OS starts and can
>>> "attack" it.
>>>
>>> Once you've gotten a seed, you can create a CSPRNG with a stream cipher
>>> such as ChaCha20, which is literally 30 lines of code.
>> If all we need is a one-time seed then virtio-rng is possibly overkill as
>> that provides a continuous stream. Instead could QEMU read a few bytes
>> from the host's /dev/urandom and pass it to EDK via fw_cfg, which can
>> use it for the CSPRNG seed. EDK would have to erase the fw_cfg field
>> to prevent the seed value leaking to the guest OS, but other than that
>> its quite straightforward.
>
> That would need anyway a change to the emulated hardware. If the guest
> is able to use virtio-rng after the firmware exits (which is the case is
> all the firmware needs is a one-time seed), then using virtio-rng is the
> simplest alternative as it needs no change at all outside the firmware.
This is a really good point!
I'll think more about using virtio-rng, hopefully without horribly
hacking OVMF's BDS code.
Thanks
Laszlo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-07 13:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-07 10:10 privileged entropy sources in QEMU/KVM guests Laszlo Ersek
2019-11-07 10:18 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-11-07 11:19 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-11-07 11:36 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-11-07 10:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-07 11:37 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-07 11:55 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2019-11-07 12:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-07 13:33 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2019-11-07 13:27 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-11-07 13:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-07 15:11 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-11-07 11:58 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-11-07 11:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2019-11-07 12:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-07 13:44 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-11-07 13:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2019-11-07 14:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-list from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=beea35c7-9608-fc2c-846a-8787c07c9c67@redhat.com \
--to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox