From: "Gerd Hoffmann" <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, acdunlap@google.com
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Harden #VC instruction emulation somewhat (CVE-2024-25742)
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 14:15:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <daghpwou63yyswucaecnuubjxabx47ygbza7l7fnc4xxsnvju4@hvxr3vdo54xg> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240417165400.3615824-1-acdunlap@google.com>
On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 09:54:00AM -0700, Adam Dunlap via groups.io wrote:
> Ensure that when a #VC exception happens, the instruction at the
> instruction pointer matches the instruction that is expected given the
> error code. This is to mitigate the ahoi WeSee attack [1] that could
> allow hypervisors to breach integrity and confidentiality of the
> firmware by maliciously injecting interrupts. This change is a
> translated version of a linux patch e3ef461af35a ("x86/sev: Harden #VC
> instruction emulation somewhat")
> +**/
> +STATIC
> +UINT64
> +VcCheckOpcodeBytes (
> + IN OUT GHCB *Ghcb,
> + IN OUT EFI_SYSTEM_CONTEXT_X64 *Regs,
> + IN OUT CC_INSTRUCTION_DATA *InstructionData,
> + IN UINT64 ExitCode
> + )
> +{
> + UINT8 OpCode;
The linux kernel patch uses "unsigned int opcode" and apparently
checks more than just the first byte for multi-byte opcodes. Why
do it differently here?
On the bigger picture: I'm wondering why SNP allows external #VC
injections in the first place?
take care,
Gerd
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-18 12:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-17 16:54 [edk2-devel] [PATCH] OvmfPkg: Harden #VC instruction emulation somewhat (CVE-2024-25742) Adam Dunlap via groups.io
2024-04-17 17:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-17 17:45 ` Adam Dunlap via groups.io
2024-04-18 8:03 ` Yao, Jiewen
2024-04-18 12:15 ` Gerd Hoffmann [this message]
2024-04-18 15:39 ` Adam Dunlap via groups.io
2024-04-18 15:43 ` Peter Gonda via groups.io
2024-04-19 11:31 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-19 14:56 ` Lendacky, Thomas via groups.io
2024-04-19 15:12 ` Lendacky, Thomas via groups.io
2024-04-19 17:39 ` Adam Dunlap via groups.io
2024-04-19 18:21 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2] " Adam Dunlap via groups.io
2024-04-22 14:12 ` Lendacky, Thomas via groups.io
2024-04-23 9:27 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-24 16:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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