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From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>, devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com,
	jejb@linux.ibm.com, erdemaktas@google.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com,
	min.m.xu@intel.com, jordan.l.justen@intel.com,
	ard.biesheuvel@arm.com,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF.
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 19:20:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dffa37d8-9139-4d55-18c1-e88bc081def4@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1624281247.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>

Hi Ashish,

(+Dave, +Paolo)

On 06/21/21 15:56, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> 
> By default all the SEV guest memory regions are considered encrypted,
> if a guest changes the encryption attribute of the page (e.g mark a
> page as decrypted) then notify hypervisor. Hypervisor will need to
> track the unencrypted pages. The information will be used during
> guest live migration, guest page migration and guest debugging.
> 
> The patch-set adds a new SEV and SEV-ES hypercall abstraction
> library to support SEV Page encryption/decryption status hypercalls
> for SEV and SEV-ES guests.
> 
> BaseMemEncryptSevLib invokes hypercalls via this new hypercall library.
> 
> The patch-set detects if it is running under KVM hypervisor and then
> checks for SEV live migration feature support via KVM_FEATURE_CPUID,
> if detected setup a new UEFI enviroment variable to indicate OVMF
> support for SEV live migration.
> 
> A branch containing these patches is available here:
> https://github.com/ashkalra/edk2/tree/sev_live_migration_v4
> 
> Changes since v3:
>  - Fix all DSC files under OvmfPkg except X64 to add support for 
>    BaseMemEncryptLib and add NULL instance of BaseMemEncryptLib
>    for 32 bit platforms.
>  - Add the MemEncryptHypercallLib-related files to Maintainers.txt,
>    in section "OvmfPkg: Confidential Computing".
>  - Add support for the new KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall interface.
>  - Add patch for SEV live migration support.

I have absolutely zero context in my mind about this work.

By v1 / v2 / v3, are you referring to the following patch series (from December 2020):

- [PATCH v1 0/2] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
  https://listman.redhat.com/archives/edk2-devel-archive/2020-December/msg00081.html

- [PATCH v2 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
  https://listman.redhat.com/archives/edk2-devel-archive/2020-December/msg00198.html

- [PATCH v3 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
  https://listman.redhat.com/archives/edk2-devel-archive/2020-December/msg00202.html

We certainly need a new TianoCore BZ for tracking this feature; I only found the above patch set versions because I have full text search for my complete email traffic on my laptop. Sending v4 after half a year hiatus is like sending it in the next century. :)

Anyway, where I'm particularly lost is that I (very vaguely) recall conflicting approaches from AMD and IBM on migration. Has an agreement been reached there?

I certainly apologize for missing the context here; had someone asked me if I had seen any version of this patch set before, I would have *sworn* that I hadn't.

I'm basically incapable of tracking this volume of development around confidential computing; sorry.

Laszlo

> 
> Changes since v2:
>  - GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted is marked explicitly
>    in the hypervisor page encryption bitmap after setting the 
>    PcdSevEsIsEnabled PCD.
> 
> Changes since v1:
>  - Mark GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted explicitly in
>    the hypervisor page encryption bitmap.
>  - Resending the series with correct shallow threading.
> 
> Ashish Kalra (3):
>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptHypercallLib: add library to support SEV hypercalls.
>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark SEC GHCB page as unencrypted via hypercall
>   OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Add support for SEV live migration.
> 
> Brijesh Singh (1):
>   OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptLib: Support to issue unencrypted hypercall
> 
>  Maintainers.txt                               |   2 +
>  OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h          |  20 ++++
>  .../Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h  |  43 +++++++
>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   1 +
>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   1 +
>  .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 |  22 ++++
>  .../Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c             |  37 ++++++
>  .../MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf                |  42 +++++++
>  .../X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm                    |  28 +++++
>  .../X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c              | 105 +++++++++++++++++
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |   1 +
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   1 +
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   1 +
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   1 +
>  OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   1 +
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c                  | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.c                |   5 +
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf              |   2 +
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/PlatformConfig.h          |   5 +
>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  |  10 ++
>  20 files changed, 436 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-22 17:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-21 13:56 [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF Ashish Kalra
2021-06-21 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptHypercallLib: add library to support SEV hypercalls Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 19:47   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 19:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 22:47   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-22 23:20     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 23:38       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-23  1:47     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-23 15:02       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptLib: Support to issue unencrypted hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 22:50   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark SEC GHCB page as unencrypted via hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 20:35   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Add support for SEV live migration Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 23:06   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-24 16:29     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 17:20 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-06-22 17:45   ` [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 17:46   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-23 13:18     ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-06-23 16:42     ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-23 16:49       ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-23 17:03         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-30  9:11         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-30 16:25           ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek

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