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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 20/32] UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 2021 18:44:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ecc85fef-66d7-40be-56d3-da27d5dafc87@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211023041349.1263726-21-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Hi Ray and Rahul,

Any comment on this patch ? If you are okay with it then can I get Ack
or R-b ?

-Brijesh

On 10/22/21 11:13 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>
> While initializing APs, the MpInitLib may need to know whether the
> guest is running with active AMD SEV or Intel TDX memory encryption.
>
> Add a new ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD that can be used to query
> the memory encryption attribute.
>
> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
> Suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  MdePkg/MdePkg.dec                             |  4 +++
>  .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h  | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
>
> diff --git a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
> index 8b18415b107a..cd903c35d2ff 100644
> --- a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
> +++ b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
> @@ -2396,5 +2396,9 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
>    # @Prompt FSB Clock.
>    gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFSBClock|200000000|UINT32|0x0000000c
>  
> +  ## This dynamic PCD indicates the memory encryption attribute of the guest.
> +  # @Prompt Memory encryption attribute
> +  gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr|0|UINT64|0x0000002e
> +
>  [UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
>    MdePkgExtra.uni
> diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h b/MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..495b0df0ac33
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
> +/** @file
> +Definitions for Confidential Computing Attribute
> +
> +Copyright (c) 2021 AMD Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> +
> +**/
> +
> +#ifndef CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_GUEST_ATTR_H_
> +#define CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_GUEST_ATTR_H_
> +
> +typedef enum {
> +  /* The guest is running with memory encryption disabled. */
> +  CCAttrNotEncrypted = 0,
> +
> +  /* The guest is running with AMD SEV memory encryption enabled. */
> +  CCAttrAmdSev      = 0x100,
> +  CCAttrAmdSevEs    = 0x101,
> +  CCAttrAmdSevSnp   = 0x102,
> +
> +  /* The guest is running with Intel TDX memory encryption enabled. */
> +  CCAttrIntelTdx    = 0x200,
> +} CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_GUEST_ATTR;
> +
> +#endif

  reply	other threads:[~2021-10-24 23:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-23  4:13 [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-24 23:45   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-04 13:53     ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 20/32] UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-10-24 23:44   ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-10-25  7:22   ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-10-25 13:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-10-23  4:13 ` [PATCH v11 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-10-24  1:46 ` [PATCH v11 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
2021-10-24  4:36   ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-24 23:54   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-29 12:26     ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-10-29 14:52       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-10-31 21:40         ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]         ` <16B33B74BAC60F9D.13000@groups.io>
2021-11-08  2:10           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-08  2:14             ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-08  2:49               ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-08  2:54                 ` Yao, Jiewen
     [not found] ` <16B08DB9AF0DA9D0.23504@groups.io>
2021-10-24 23:43   ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
     [not found] ` <16B08DB907104617.16488@groups.io>
2021-10-24 23:43   ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
     [not found] ` <16B08DB7BBA673AC.26581@groups.io>
2021-10-24 23:44   ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v11 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh

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