From: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, dandan.bi@intel.com
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 12:34:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f3e721b3-038a-a46b-257f-831c5a7f35d8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190918030557.55256-4-dandan.bi@intel.com>
Hi Dandan,
On 9/18/19 5:05 AM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
>
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
>
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer
> the execution of the image.
>
> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
> MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 9 +++++++++
> .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
> if (FilePath != NULL) {
> FreePool (FilePath);
> }
>
> if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
OK
> + }
> //
> // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to load boot option
> //
> BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
> BootOption->Status = Status;
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> index 07592f8ebd..af47b787d1 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> /** @file
> Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load options.
>
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> @@ -1409,10 +1409,19 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
> FileSize,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> FreePool (FileBuffer);
>
What about:
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
} else {
> Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
> ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
>
> ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize;
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> index 6b8fb4d924..833e38c6fe 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> /** @file
> Misc library functions.
>
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> @@ -491,10 +491,19 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
> ImageDevicePath,
> NULL,
> 0,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Ditto.
The logic is correct, but the code workflow is now odd.
> LoadCount++;
> //
> // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
> // a 5 Minute period
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-24 10:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-18 3:05 [patch v2 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-18 3:05 ` [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:27 ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18 3:05 ` [patch v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18 3:23 ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:35 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18 3:05 ` [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18 5:28 ` [edk2-devel] " Gao, Zhichao
2019-09-24 10:34 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé [this message]
2019-09-18 3:05 ` [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18 3:49 ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:37 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18 3:05 ` [patch v2 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:30 ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
[not found] ` <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>
2019-09-24 1:28 ` [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
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