From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 27C1D2041D9DF for ; Wed, 29 Mar 2017 08:37:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3890AC051668; Wed, 29 Mar 2017 15:37:57 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mx1.redhat.com 3890AC051668 Authentication-Results: ext-mx07.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: ext-mx07.extmail.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=lersek@redhat.com DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.redhat.com 3890AC051668 Received: from lacos-laptop-7.usersys.redhat.com (ovpn-116-134.phx2.redhat.com [10.3.116.134]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A53279666A; Wed, 29 Mar 2017 15:37:50 +0000 (UTC) To: Christoffer Dall , gengdongjiu References: <58D17AF0.2010802@arm.com> <20170321193933.GB31111@cbox> <58DA3F68.6090901@arm.com> <20170328112328.GA31156@cbox> <20170328115413.GJ23682@e104320-lin> <58DA67BA.8070404@arm.com> <5b7352f4-4965-3ed5-3879-db871797be47@huawei.com> <20170329103658.GQ23682@e104320-lin> <20170329144822.GA1020@cbox> Cc: Achin Gupta , gengdongjiu , ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, edk2-devel@lists.01.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, zhaoshenglong@huawei.com, James Morse , xiexiuqi@huawei.com, Marc Zyngier , catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, christoffer.dall@linaro.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, andre.przywara@arm.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, vladimir.murzin@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com, wuquanming@huawei.com, huangshaoyu@huawei.com, Leif.Lindholm@linaro.com, nd@arm.com From: Laszlo Ersek Message-ID: Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 17:37:49 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20170329144822.GA1020@cbox> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.15 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.31]); Wed, 29 Mar 2017 15:37:57 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH] kvm: pass the virtual SEI syndrome to guest OS X-BeenThere: edk2-devel@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: EDK II Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 15:37:58 -0000 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 03/29/17 16:48, Christoffer Dall wrote: > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 10:36:51PM +0800, gengdongjiu wrote: >> 2017-03-29 18:36 GMT+08:00, Achin Gupta : >>> Qemu is essentially fulfilling the role of secure firmware at the >>> EL2/EL1 interface (as discussed with Christoffer below). So it >>> should generate the CPER before injecting the error. >>> >>> This is corresponds to (1) above apart from notifying UEFI (I am >>> assuming you mean guest UEFI). At this time, the guest OS already >>> knows where to pick up the CPER from through the HEST. Qemu has >>> to create the CPER and populate its address at the address >>> exported in the HEST. Guest UEFI should not be involved in this >>> flow. Its job was to create the HEST at boot and that has been >>> done by this stage. >> >> Sorry, As I understand it, after Qemu generate the CPER table, it >> should pass the CPER table to the guest UEFI, then Guest UEFI place >> this CPER table to the guest OS memory. In this flow, the Guest UEFI >> should be involved, else the Guest OS can not see the CPER table. >> > > I think you need to explain the "pass the CPER table to the guest UEFI" > concept in terms of what really happens, step by step, and when you say > "then Guest UEFI place the CPER table to the guest OS memory", I'm > curious who is running what code on the hardware when doing that. I strongly suggest to keep the guest firmware's runtime involvement to zero. Two reasons: (1) As you explained above (... which I conveniently snipped), when you inject an interrupt to the guest, the handler registered for that interrupt will come from the guest kernel. The only exception to this is when the platform provides a type of interrupt whose handler can be registered and then locked down by the firmware. On x86, this is the SMI. In practice though, - in OVMF (x86), we only do synchronous (software-initiated) SMIs (for privileged UEFI varstore access), - and in ArmVirtQemu (ARM / aarch64), none of the management mode stuff exists at all. I understand that the Platform Init 1.5 (or 1.6?) spec abstracted away the MM (management mode) protocols from Intel SMM, but at this point there is zero code in ArmVirtQemu for that. (And I'm unsure how much of any eligible underlying hw emulation exists in QEMU.) So you can't get the guest firmware to react to the injected interrupt without the guest OS coming between first. (2) Achin's description matches really-really closely what is possible, and what should be done with QEMU, ArmVirtQemu, and the guest kernel. In any solution for this feature, the firmware has to reserve some memory from the OS at boot. The current facilities we have enable this. As I described previously, the ACPI linker/loader actions can be mapped more or less 1:1 to Achin's design. From a practical perspective, you really want to keep the guest firmware as dumb as possible (meaning: as generic as possible), and keep the ACPI specifics to the QEMU and the guest kernel sides. The error serialization actions -- the co-operation between guest kernel and QEMU on the special memory areas -- that were mentioned earlier by Michael and Punit look like a complication. But, IMO, they don't differ from any other device emulation -- DMA actions in particular -- that QEMU already does. Device models are what QEMU *does*. Read the command block that the guest driver placed in guest memory, parse it, sanity check it, verify it, execute it, write back the status code, inject an interrupt (and/or let any polling guest driver notice it "soon after" -- use barriers as necessary). Thus, I suggest to rely on the generic ACPI linker/loader interface (between QEMU and guest firmware) *only* to make the firmware lay out stuff (= reserve buffers, set up pointers, install QEMU's ACPI tables) *at boot*. Then, at runtime, let the guest kernel and QEMU (the "device model") talk to each other directly. Keep runtime firmware involvement to zero. You *really* don't want to debug three components at runtime, when you can solve the thing with two. (Two components whose build systems won't drive you mad, I should add.) IMO, Achin's design nailed it. We can do that. Laszlo