From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: devel@edk2.groups.io, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Mario Smarduch <mario.smarduch@amd.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RESEND] [PATCH v2 2/2] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Exclude SEV launch secrets page from pre-validation
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 12:50:10 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fc169efc-7818-8c8c-2e0f-e6c1038aca4f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <532bb5b0-952b-c830-8de8-fe31f9aa6283@linux.ibm.com>
On 2/23/23 09:04, Dov Murik wrote:
>
>
> On 23/02/2023 16:58, Dov Murik wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21/02/2023 11:38, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
>>> On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 08:44:23AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>> On 2/20/23 02:49, Dov Murik wrote:
>>>>> In order to allow the VMM (such as QEMU) to add a page with hashes of
>>>>> kernel/initrd/cmdline for measured direct boot on SNP, this page must
>>>>> not be part of the SNP metadata list reported to the VMM.
>>>>>
>>>>> Check if that page is defined; if it is, skip it in the metadata list.
>>>>> In such case, VMM should fill the page with the hashes content, or
>>>>> explicitly update it as a zero page (if kernel hashes are not used).
>>>>
>>>> Would it be better to define a new section type (similar to what I did in
>>>> the SVSM PoC)? This way, it remains listed in the metadata and allows the
>>>> VMM to detect it and decide how to handle it.
>>>
>>> Explicitly describing things sounds better to me too.
>>>
>>
>> Thanks for the feedback Tom and Gerd.
>>
>>
>> I can define a new section type OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_KERNEL_HASHES. In the AmdSev
>> target it'll cover the single MEMFD page at 00F000 (after the CPUID page).
>> Now there's a question for the QEMU side -- should QEMU then fill the page
>> and encrypt it (launch_update type=NORMAL)? (currently the whole hashes table
>> creation and encryption is done elsewhere there)
Yes, I think that is the way to go. Allocate a page in Qemu, zero it out,
fill in the hash values at the proper location and then do a launch update
for type NORMAL page. You can use the section type to identify the data
you need to retrieve and encrypt.
>>
>> And on regular OvmfX64 builds - should that area should be with type
>> OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_SNP_SEC_MEM which is accepted as a type=ZERO page ?
>>
>>
>> Playing with this idea, the metadata list will add:
>>
>>
>> ; Kernel hashes section for measured direct boot
>> %define OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_KERNEL_HASHES 0x5
>>
>> ...
>>
>> ; Kernel hashes for measured direct boot, or zero page if
>> ; there are no kernel hashes / SEV secrets
>> SevSnpKernelHashes:
>> DD SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_BASE
>> DD SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_SIZE
>> DD SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_TYPE
>>
>
> Or maybe this metadata section ^^^^^ should be added only if the Pcd for
> secrets+hashes page is defined?
That would be optimal if you could do that.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> -Dov
>
>>
>>
>> and the base/size/type of that region are defined in an
>> %if statement in ResetVector.nasmb:
>>
>>
>> %if (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase) > 0)
>> ; There's a reserved page for SEV secrets and hashes; the VMM will fill and
>> ; validate the page
>> %define SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_TYPE OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_KERNEL_HASHES
>> %define SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_BASE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase))
>> %else
>> ; No SEV secrets and hashes page; the VMM will validate it as another zero page
>> %define SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_TYPE OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_SNP_SEC_MEM
>> %define SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_BASE (CPUID_BASE + CPUID_SIZE)
>> %endif
>> %define SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_SIZE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase) - SEV_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES_BASE)
>>
>>
>> (I still need to figure out the point about QEMU above.)
>>
>>
>> Is that what you had in mind?
>>
>> -Dov
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-27 18:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-20 8:49 [RESEND] [PATCH v2 0/2] OvmfPkg: Enable measured direct boot on AMD SEV-SNP Dov Murik
2023-02-20 8:49 ` [RESEND] [PATCH v2 1/2] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Reorder MEMFD pages to match the order in OvmfPkgX64.fdf Dov Murik
2023-02-20 8:49 ` [RESEND] [PATCH v2 2/2] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Exclude SEV launch secrets page from pre-validation Dov Murik
2023-02-20 14:44 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2023-02-21 9:38 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2023-02-23 14:58 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-23 15:04 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-27 18:50 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
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