public inbox for devel@edk2.groups.io
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Adam Dunlap" <acdunlap@google.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	 Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	 Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	 James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	 Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate SEC's GHCB page
Date: Fri,  9 Dec 2022 13:04:16 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fc4bf097311f2192611042c176092df98f24ad08.1670616875.git.acdunlap@google.com> (raw)

When running under SEV-ES, a page of shared memory is allocated for the
GHCB during the SEC phase at address 0x809000. This page of memory is
eventually passed to the OS as EfiConventionalMemory. When running
SEV-SNP, this page is not PVALIDATE'd in the RMP table, meaning that if
the guest OS tries to access the page, it will think that the host has
voilated the security guarantees and will likely crash.

This patch validates this page immediately after EDK2 switches to using
the GHCB page allocated for the PEI phase.

This was tested by writing a UEFI application that reads to and writes
from one byte of each page of memory and checks to see if a #VC
exception is generated indicating that the page was not validated.

Fixes: 6995a1b79bab ("OvmfPkg: Create a GHCB page for use during Sec phase")

Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
---

Removed the PcdStatus variable and just use Status for all statuses in
this function. Use uncrustify to fix some formatting errors.

 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
index e1b9fd9b7f..b2f2f3ac26 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
   UINTN                GhcbBackupPageCount;
   SEV_ES_PER_CPU_DATA  *SevEsData;
   UINTN                PageCount;
-  RETURN_STATUS        PcdStatus, DecryptStatus;
+  RETURN_STATUS        Status;
   IA32_DESCRIPTOR      Gdtr;
   VOID                 *Gdt;
 
@@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
     return;
   }
 
-  PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (PcdSevEsIsEnabled, TRUE);
-  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
+  Status = PcdSetBoolS (PcdSevEsIsEnabled, TRUE);
+  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
 
   //
   // Allocate GHCB and per-CPU variable pages.
@@ -240,20 +240,20 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
   // only clear the encryption mask for the GHCB pages.
   //
   for (PageCount = 0; PageCount < GhcbPageCount; PageCount += 2) {
-    DecryptStatus = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
-                      0,
-                      GhcbBasePa + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (PageCount),
-                      1
-                      );
-    ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (DecryptStatus);
+    Status = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
+               0,
+               GhcbBasePa + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (PageCount),
+               1
+               );
+    ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
   }
 
   ZeroMem (GhcbBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
 
-  PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbBase, GhcbBasePa);
-  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
-  PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbSize, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
-  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
+  Status = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbBase, GhcbBasePa);
+  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
+  Status = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbSize, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
+  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
 
   DEBUG ((
     DEBUG_INFO,
@@ -295,6 +295,20 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
 
   AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, GhcbBasePa);
 
+  //
+  // Now that the PEI GHCB is set up, the SEC GHCB page is no longer necessary
+  // to keep shared. Later, it is exposed to the OS as EfiConventionalMemory, so
+  // it needs to be marked private. The size of the region is hardcoded in
+  // OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb in the definition of
+  // SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_2.
+  //
+  Status = MemEncryptSevSetPageEncMask (
+             0,                                  // Cr3 -- use system Cr3
+             FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase), // BaseAddress
+             1                                   // NumPages
+             );
+  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
+
   //
   // The SEV support will clear the C-bit from non-RAM areas.  The early GDT
   // lives in a non-RAM area, so when an exception occurs (like a #VC) the GDT
-- 
2.39.0.rc1.256.g54fd8350bd-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2022-12-09 21:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-09 21:04 Adam Dunlap [this message]
2022-12-12 19:29 ` [PATCH v3] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate SEC's GHCB page Lendacky, Thomas
2022-12-15  8:10   ` Yao, Jiewen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-list from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=fc4bf097311f2192611042c176092df98f24ad08.1670616875.git.acdunlap@google.com \
    --to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox