From: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
To: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, edk2-devel@lists.01.org
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>,
Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] [CVE-2017-5753] Bounds Check Bypass issue in SMI handlers
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 22:51:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fd33e9db-9987-3ff1-4c1a-612cf8acf2e8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180925061259.31680-1-hao.a.wu@intel.com>
On 09/25/18 08:12, Hao Wu wrote:
> V2 changes:
> A. Rename the newly introduced BaseLib API to 'AsmLfence', and makes it
> IA32/X64 specific.
>
> B. Add brief comments before calls of the AsmLfence() to state the
> purpose.
>
> C. Refine the patch for Variable/RuntimeDxe driver and make the change
> focus on the SMM code.
>
> V1 history:
> The series aims to mitigate the Bounds Check Bypass (CVE-2017-5753) issues
> within SMI handlers.
>
> A more detailed explanation of the purpose of the series is under the
> 'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
> https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
>
> And the document at:
> https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
>
> Hao Wu (5):
> MdePkg/BaseLib: Add new AsmLfence API
> MdeModulePkg/FaultTolerantWrite:[CVE-2017-5753]Fix bounds check bypass
> MdeModulePkg/SmmLockBox: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix bounds check bypass
> MdeModulePkg/Variable: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix bounds check bypass
> UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix bounds check bypass
>
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteSmm.c | 7 ++++
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteSmm.inf | 1 +
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.c | 10 ++++++
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/LoadFenceDxe.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/LoadFenceSmm.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/PrivilegePolymorphic.h | 13 ++++++-
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c | 6 ++++
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf | 1 +
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c | 18 ++++++++++
> MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf | 1 +
> MdePkg/Include/Library/BaseLib.h | 13 +++++++
> MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/BaseLib.inf | 2 ++
> MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/Ia32/Lfence.nasm | 37 +++++++++++++++++++
> MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X64/Lfence.nasm | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++
> UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.c | 5 +++
> 15 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/LoadFenceDxe.c
> create mode 100644 MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/LoadFenceSmm.c
> create mode 100644 MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/Ia32/Lfence.nasm
> create mode 100644 MdePkg/Library/BaseLib/X64/Lfence.nasm
>
I regression-tested this series using:
(1) roughly the Linux guest steps from
<https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/Testing-SMM-with-QEMU,-KVM-and-libvirt#tests-to-perform-in-the-installed-guest-fedora-26-guest>.
Those steps cover all of the SMM variable driver, the SMM FTW driver,
the SMM lockbox, and PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
(2) For briefly checking the runtime (non-SMM) variable driver, I booted
Fedora guests on X64 OVMF and AARCH64 ArmVirtQemu, and invoked
"efibootmgr -v".
series
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Thanks,
Laszlo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-25 20:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 6:12 [PATCH v2 0/5] [CVE-2017-5753] Bounds Check Bypass issue in SMI handlers Hao Wu
2018-09-25 6:12 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] MdePkg/BaseLib: Add new AsmLfence API Hao Wu
2018-09-25 13:00 ` Laszlo Ersek
2018-09-26 1:13 ` Wu, Hao A
2018-09-29 2:33 ` Gao, Liming
2018-09-25 6:12 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/FaultTolerantWrite:[CVE-2017-5753]Fix bounds check bypass Hao Wu
2018-09-29 6:11 ` Zeng, Star
2018-09-29 6:21 ` Wu, Hao A
2018-09-29 6:25 ` Zeng, Star
2018-09-25 6:12 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/SmmLockBox: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix " Hao Wu
2018-09-29 6:11 ` Zeng, Star
2018-09-25 6:12 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/Variable: " Hao Wu
2018-09-29 6:13 ` Zeng, Star
2018-09-25 6:12 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: " Hao Wu
2018-09-25 12:08 ` Laszlo Ersek
2018-09-26 1:00 ` Wu, Hao A
2018-09-26 0:46 ` Dong, Eric
2018-09-25 20:51 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2018-09-25 20:57 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] [CVE-2017-5753] Bounds Check Bypass issue in SMI handlers Laszlo Ersek
2018-09-26 1:17 ` Wu, Hao A
2018-09-28 13:13 ` Yao, Jiewen
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